Abstract
The distribution of natural resources such as fish or forest, among many others, is an everyday political, economic, and ecological issue. Auctions are a possible alternative for grandfathering (historical rights). As many economists believe, an auction is the most efficient procedure to distribute quotas for resources. In 2019, the auction for Russian crab quotas yielded the largest revenue (more than 2 bln. euros) among world auctions, except for spectrum auctions. We analyse the strategic behavior of its participants and propose a better scheme of auction which is more favorable for newcomers and small companies, and potentially generates more revenue (up to 40% on 19 out of 31 lots) for the government.
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Article number | 104266 |
| Journal | Marine Policy |
| Volume | 122 |
| DOIs | |
| State | Published - Dec 2020 |
| Externally published | Yes |
Keywords
- Auction
- Crab quotas
- Game theory
- Grandfathering
- Strategic analysis